국제형사법상 정범과 공범 구분에 대한 법경제학적 분석과 시사점^*

^* 사랑하는 가족과 많은 가르침을 주고 계신 부모님, 서울대학교 이재민 교수님께 감사의 말씀을 드립니다. 또한, 본고는 개인적인 견해로 정부 입장과는 무관하다는 점을 밝힙니다.

¹⁾ 박미경, “국제형사재판소(ICC)규정 제25조 제3항에서의 공범의 개념”, ｢국제법평론｣ 제43호, 국제법평론회, 2016, pp. 79-81.

²⁾ Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Article 7(Individual criminal responsibility):

²⁾ “1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.“ (emphasis added)

³⁾ 박경규, “ICTY 판례에 의해 확립된 JCE이론의 법적 성격”, ｢서울법학｣ 제23권제3호, 서울시립대학교 법학연구소, 2016, pp. 308-309.; 당초 ICTY규정 제7조제1항은 기소된 피고인이 직접 ‘실행한(committed)’ 범죄행위에 대해 개인의 형사책임을 추궁하기 위한 목적으로 성안되었다. 세부적인 사항은 최태현·박미경, “JCE이론의 주요 내용과 그에 대한 비판”, ｢법학논집｣ 제31권제2호, 이화여자대학교 법학연구소, 2014, pp. 175-176. 참조.

⁴⁾ Barbora Holá·Alette Smeulers·Catrien Bijleveld, “International Sentencing Facts and Figures”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 9, 2011, pp. 417-418.

⁵⁾ 박미경, “국제형사재판소(ICC)의 ‘범행지배이론’에 대한 고찰”, ｢국제법학회논총｣ 제60권제4호, 대한국제법학회, 2015, pp 151-153.

⁶⁾ Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, IT-94-1-A, Judgement of 15 July 1999, para. 229.

⁶⁾ “229. In light of the preceding propositions it is now appropriate to distinguish between acting in pursuance of a common purpose or design to commit a crime, and aiding and abetting.

⁶⁾ (i) The aider and abettor is always an accessory to a crime perpetrated by another person, the principal.

⁶⁾ (...)“ (emphasis added)

⁷⁾ 영미법계의 전통을 따르는 형식적 객관설은, 모든 형사책임 유형에 원칙적으로 동일한 법정형을 위하하고 있어 정범보다 공범에 더 무거운 처벌이 가능하다. 특히, 형사책임 유형의 요건만 충족된다면 구체적 형량판단은 형사책임 유형과 무관하게 독자적 양형원리에 따라 이루어지게 된다. 세부적인 사항은 박경규, Supra Note 3, pp. 302-308. 참조.

⁸⁾ 객관적·주관적 측면의 입증부담에 있어 상관의 형사책임 적용보다 JCE 법리 적용이 더 수월하다는 견해가 있다. 세부적인 사항은 김성규, “국제형사법에 있어서의 정범의 개념 –국제형사재판에 있어서의 ‘공동범죄계획’ 및 ‘공동범죄실행‘의 개념을 중심으로-”, ｢외법논집｣ 제38권제2호, 한국외국어대학교 법학연구소, 2014, pp. 40-42. 참조.; JCE 이론이 범죄 실행행위에 직접 가담하지 않은 자에게도 당해 범죄 실행결과에 대한 형사책임을 부과한다는 측면에서 한국의 공모공동정범 이론과 유사하다는 견해가 있다. 세부적인 사항은 설일영, “공동범죄집단(Joint Criminal Enterprise) 법리 연구: ICTY의 판례를 중심으로”, ｢인도법논총｣ 제30호, 대한적십자사 인도법연구소, 2010, pp 23-24. 참조.; JCE는 세 가지 유형으로 분류될 수 있다. 제1유형은 공동목적 범위 내에서 발생한 범죄, 제2유형은 집단수용소에서 발생한 범죄, 제3유형은 공동목적 범위를 일탈하여 발생한 범죄를 다룬다. 세부적인 사항은 설일영, Ibid., pp 26-27. 참조.

⁹⁾ Supra Note 6, para. 188, 190.

⁹⁾ “188. This provision covers first and foremost the physical perpetration of a crime by the offender himself, or the culpable omission of an act that was mandated by a rule of criminal law. However, the commission of one of the crimes envisaged in Articles 2, 3, 4 or 5 of the Statute might also occur through participation in the realisation of a common design or purpose.

⁹⁾ 190. It should be noted that this notion is spelled out in the Secretary General’s Report, according to which:

⁹⁾ The Secretary-General believes that all persons who participate in the planning, preparation or execution of serious violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia are individually responsible for such violations.

⁹⁾ Thus, all those who have engaged in serious violations of international humanitarian law, whatever the manner in which they may have perpetrated, or participated in the perpetration of those violations, must be brought to justice. If this is so, it is fair to conclude that the Statute does not confine itself to providing for jurisdiction over those persons who plan, instigate, order, physically perpetrate a crime or otherwise aid and abet in its planning, preparation or execution. The Statute does not stop there. It does not exclude those modes of participating in the commission of crimes which occur where several persons having a common purpose embark on criminal activity that is then carried out either jointly or by some members of this plurality of persons. Whoever contributes to the commission of crimes by the group of persons or some members of the group, in execution of a common criminal purpose, may be held to be criminally liable, subject to certain conditions, which are specified below.“ (emphasis added, footnote omitted)

¹⁰⁾ Supra Note 1, pp 79-81.; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dylio, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the confirmation of charges of 29 January 2007, para. 329.

¹⁰⁾ “329. The subjective approach – which is the approach adopted by the jurisprudence of the ICTY through the concept of joint criminal enterprise or the common purpose doctrine – moves the focus from the level of contribution to the commission of the offence as the distinguishing criterion between principals and accessories, and places it instead on the state of mind in which the contribution to the crime was made. As a result, only those who make their contribution with the shared intent to commit the offence can be considered principals to the crime, regardless of the level of their contribution to its commission.“

¹¹⁾ 최태현·박미경, Supra Note 3, pp. 173-175.

¹²⁾ Ibid., pp. 175-176.

¹³⁾ Prosecutor v. Radolsalv Brđanin, IT-99-36-A, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of 19 March 2004, para. 5.

¹³⁾ “5. The elements of a crime are those facts which the Prosecution must prove to establish that the conduct of the perpetrator constituted the crime alleged. However, participants other than the direct perpetrator of the criminal act may also incur liability for a crime, and in many cases different mens rea standards may apply to direct perpetrators and other persons. The third category of joint criminal enterprise liability is, as with other forms of criminal liability, such as command responsibility or aiding and abetting, not an element of a particular crime. It is a mode of liability through which an accused may be individually criminally responsible despite not being the direct perpetrator of the offence. An accused convicted of a crime under the third category of joint criminal enterprise need not be shown to have intended to commit the crime or even to have known with certainty that the crime was to be committed. Rather, it is sufficient that that accused entered into a joint criminal enterprise to commit a different crime with the awareness that the commission of that agreed upon crime made it reasonably foreseeable to him that the crime charged would be committed by other members of the joint criminal enterprise, and it was committed.“ (emphasis added, footnote omitted)

¹⁴⁾ 최태현·박미경, Supra Note 3, pp. 193-195.

¹⁵⁾ Jens David Ohlin, “Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 5, 2007, pp. 85-88.

¹⁶⁾ 설일영, Supra Note 8, pp 31-32.

¹⁷⁾ Supra Note 15, pp. 81-85.; 설일영, Supra Note 8, pp 39-40.; JCE 이론은 범죄가담 수준, 범죄 기여정도 등 객관적 구성요건을 거의 고려하지 않고, 주관적 구성요건을 중심으로 범죄행위와 관련된 자를 모두 처벌하여 개인의 형사책임 원칙을 약화시켰다는 비판이 제기되었다. 세부적인 사항은 Supra Note 5, pp 168-171. 참조.

¹⁸⁾ Gerhard Werle·Florian Jeϐberger, Principles of International Criminal Law, Fourth Edition, (Oxford, 2020), pp. 240-245.; 최태현·박미경, Supra Note 3, pp. 190-192.

¹⁹⁾ 김성규, Supra Note 8, pp. 47-48.; 최태현·박미경, Ibid., pp. 192-193.

²⁰⁾ 박경규, “국제형사재판소 로마규정 제25조 제3항 제(d)목상 범죄참가형태의 법적 성격, 구체적 요건 및 정당성”, ｢비교형사법연구｣ 제18권제2호, 한국비교형사법학회, 2016, pp. 107-111.; 국제형사재판소 규정 제25조제3항상 정범과 공범 구분에 대한 논란이 지속되고 있으나, 국제형사재판소가 범행지배이론에 근거하여 정범과 공범 구분하는 기본 입장을 변경하지 않을 것으로 보는 견해가 존재한다. 세부적인 사항은 박경규, “간접정범의 공동정범? -국제형사재판소(ICC) 판례와 독일 및 국내의 논의를 중심으로-”, ｢형사법연구｣ 제29권제4호, 한국형사법학회, 2017, pp. 41-42. 참조.; 반면, 국제형사재판소 규정 제25조제3항에 대해 통일정범자 체계를 적용해야 한다는 견해도 존재한다. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute of 14 March 2012, Separate Opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford, paras. 6-12. Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-02/12, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute of 18 December 2012, Concurring Opinion of Judge Van Den Wyngaert, paras. 22-30.

²¹⁾ 국제형사재판소 규정 제25조제3항은 개인의 형사책임 부과에 있어 차등화 모델(differentiation model)을 채택하고 있으며, 제25조제3항(a)호내지 (d)호간에 위계가 존재한다는 견해가 있다. 세부적인 사항은 Gerhard Werle, “Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 5, 2007, pp. 956-957. 참조.; 국제형사재판소 규정 제25조제3항(a)호는 정범 유형을 ①직접범죄실행자, ②공동범죄실행자, ③간접범죄실행자로 대별하고 있으며, Katanga and Chui 사건에서 국제형사재판소 전심재판부는 ④간접공동범죄실행자를 범죄참가형태로 추가적으로 인정할 수 있다는 입장을 표명하였다. 세부적인 사항은 박미경, “국제형사법상 정범 개념의 우리나라 이행법률에의 적용가능성”, ｢법학연구｣ 제59집, 전북대학교 부설법학연구소, 2019, pp. 169-184. 참조.

²²⁾ 국제형사재판소 규정 제25조제3항(d)호는 제25조제3항(c)호상 방조범 이외의 행위태양을 규정하고 있다는 견해가 있다. 세부적인 사항은 조인현, “국제형사재판소 규정 공모(共謀) 범죄에 대한 처벌 범위 –효당의 공범론 구상에 기초하여-”, ｢비교형사법연구｣ 제20권제2호, 한국비교형사법학회, 2018, pp. 149-150. 참조.; JCE 이론과 국제형사재판소 규정 제25조제3항(d)호간 유사성으로 인해 (d)호가 JCE 이론을 반영한 것이라는 평가도 존재하나, (d)호는 가담(participation)의 형태를 규율한다는 점에서 차이가 존재한다는 견해가 있다. 세부적인 사항은 Supra Note 1, pp. 84-92 참조.

²³⁾ 박미경, Supra Note 21, pp. 160-161.; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dylio, SupraNote 10, para. 338.

²³⁾ “338. Not having accepted the objective and subjective approaches for distinguishing between principals and accessories to a crime, the Chamber considers, as does the Prosecution and, unlike the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, that the Statute embraces the third approach, which is based on the concept of control over the crime.“ (emphasis added)

²⁴⁾ Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dylio, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute of 14 March 2012, para. 920.

²⁴⁾ “920. The Pre-Trial Chamber held that under the control over the crime approach, in contrast to the objective approach, the principals to a crime are not limited to those who physically carry out the objective elements of the offence. Rather, principals also include those individuals who, in spite of their absence from the scene of the crime, control or mastermind its commission because they decide whether and, if so, how the offence will be committed.“ (emphasis added, footnote omitted)

²⁵⁾ Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his conviction of 1 December 2014, para. 462.

²⁵⁾ “462. What is, however, of relevance to the proper interpretation of the term “[c]ommits such a crime […] jointly with another […] person” is its interplay with other forms of criminal liability set out in article 25 (3) of the Statute. In that regard, the Appeals Chamber observes that, under this provision, an individual can be held criminally responsible for either committing a crime (sub-paragraph a)) or for contributing to the commission of a crime by another person or persons in one of the ways described in sub-paragraphs b) to d). This indicates that the Statute differentiates between two principal forms of liability, namely liability as a perpetrator and liability as an accessory. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, this distinction is not merely terminological; making this distinction is important because, generally speaking and all other things being equal, a person who is found to commit a crime him- or herself bears more blameworthiness than a person who contributes to the crime of another person or persons. Accordingly, it contributes to a proper labelling of the accused person’s criminal responsibility.“ (emphasis added, footnote omitted)

²⁶⁾ SupraNote 18, pp. 237-239.; 국제형사재판소 규정 제25조제3항의 형사책임 유형별 기여 요건과 관련하여 제25조제3항(a)호는 본질적 기여(essential contribution)가 요구되는 반면, 제25조제3항(b)호내지 (d)호는 실질적 기여(substantial contribution)로 충분하므로, 이러한 기여도의 차이가 형사책임 유형간 위계가 존재한다는 것을 시사한다는 견해가 있다. 세부적인 사항은 박미경, Supra Note 21, pp. 165-169. 참조.

²⁷⁾ Jens David Ohlin·Elies Van Siledregt·Thomas Weigend, “Assessing the Control-Theory”, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 26, 2013, pp. 740-743.; Supra Note 18, pp. 254-264.; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dylio, Supra Note 10, para. 330.

²⁷⁾ “330. The concept of control over the crime constitutes a third approach for distinguishing between principals and accessories which, contrary to the Defence claim, is applied in numerous legal systems. The notion underpinning this third approach is that principals to a crime are not limited to those who physically carry out the objective elements of the offence, but also include those who, in spite of being removed from the scene of the crime, control or mastermind its commission because they decide whether and how the offence will be committed.“ (footnote omitted, emphasis added)

²⁸⁾ Supra Note 1, pp 81-84.

²⁹⁾ Ibid.,pp 81-84.

³⁰⁾ 김성규, Supra Note 8, pp. 45-47.

³¹⁾ Supra Note 1, pp 94-96.

³²⁾ Jens David Ohlin·Elies Van Siledregt·Thomas Weigend, Supra Note 27, pp. 740-743.

³³⁾ International Criminal Court Rules of Procedure and Evidence Article 145(Determination of sentence)

³³⁾ “1. In its determination of the sentence pursuant to article 78, paragraph 1, the Court shall:

³³⁾ (c) In addition to the factors mentioned in article 78, paragraph 1, give consideration, inter alia, to the extent of the damage caused, in particular the harm caused to the victims and their families, the nature of the unlawful behaviour and the means employed to execute the crime; the degree of participation of the convicted person; the degree of intent; the circumstances of manner, time and location; and the age, education, social and economic condition of the convicted person.“ (emphasis added)

³⁴⁾ 박미경, Supra Note 21, pp. 160-165.; Supra Note 1, pp 94-96.

³⁵⁾ 정범과 공범을 구분하지 않고 범죄 참여여부를 기준으로 동일한 형사책임을 추궁하는 통일정범자 체계의 경우 ①형사처벌 범위의 불명확성, ②형량 선고가 형량이론에만 의존하기 때문에 재판관에게 재량이 과도하게 부과될 수 있다는 비판이 존재한다. 세부적인 사항은 박미경, Supra Note 21, pp. 161-165. 참조.

³⁶⁾ 임시 국제형사재판소 판례에 따르면 특정한 형사책임 유형은 형사책임 정도를 판단하는 지표가 될 수 있으며, 형량 단계에서 고려될 수 있다. See Supra Note 18, pp. 237-238.

³⁷⁾ Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., ICTR-98-41, Trial Judgement of 18 November 2008, para. 2270.

³⁷⁾ “Under Rwandan law, similar crimes carry the possible penalties of life imprisonment, depending on the nature of the accused’s participation. In this Tribunal, a sentence of life imprisonment is generally reserved those who planned or ordered atrocities as well as the most senior authorities. In the Chamber’s view, the gravity of the crimes committed by Bagosora, Ntabakuze and Nsengiyumva warrants similar treatment.“ (emphasis added, footnote omitted)

³⁸⁾ Prosecutor v. Simić et al., IT-95-9, Judgement of 28 November 2006, para. 265.

³⁸⁾ “265. Regarding the gravity of the offence, the Appeals Chamber recalls that aiding and abetting is a form of responsibility which generally warrants a lower sentence than is appropriate to responsibility as a participant in a joint criminal enterprise.Thus, in assessing the gravity of the offence, the Appeals Chamber takes into consideration that it has set aside the Appellant’s conviction under Article 7(1) of the Statute for his participation in a joint criminal enterprise, and has found him responsible for aiding and abetting the crime of persecutions through the unlawful arrests and detention of non-Serb civilians, the confinement under inhumane conditions of non-Serb prisoners, the forced labour of Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim civilians, and the forcible displacements of non-Serb civilians, under Count 1 of the Fifth Amended Indictment. Moreover, it bears in mind that in re-qualifying the Appellant’s individual criminal responsibility, the Appeals Chamber has set aside his conviction for persecutions under Count 1 of the Fifth Amended Indictment for cruel and inhumane treatment insofar as the conduct underlying this conviction encompasses the acts of beatings and torture.“ (emphasis added, footnote omitted)

³⁹⁾ Supra Note 6, para. 192.

³⁹⁾ “192. Under these circumstances, to hold criminally liable as a perpetrator only the person who materially performs the criminal act would disregard the role as co-perpetrators of all those who in some way made it possible for the perpetrator physically to carry out that criminal act. At the same time, depending upon the circumstances, to hold the latter liable only as aiders and abettors might understate the degree of their criminal responsibility.“ (emphasis added)

⁴⁰⁾ Prosecutor v. Martić, IT-95-11, Judgement of 8 October 2008, Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg on the Individual Criminal Responsibility of Milan Martić, para. 9.

⁴⁰⁾ “9. I also note with concern that neither the artificial concept of JCE nor its compartmentalization in three categories has any added value when it comes to sentencing. The decisive element must be in principle the individual contribution of an accused. At times, the incorrect impression is given that the third category of JCE attracts a lower sentence simply because of its catch-all nature. However, in principle, a person’s guilt must be described as increasing in tandem with his position in the hierarchy: The higher in rank or further detached the mastermind is from the person who commits a crime with his own hands, the greater is his responsibility.“ (emphasis added, footnote omitted)

⁴¹⁾ 박미경, Supra Note 21, pp. 161-165.

⁴²⁾ Supra Note 18, pp. 237-238. 예를 들면, 제25조제3항(b)호상 명령범에 대해서는 제25조제3항(a)호상 범죄실행자에 비해 더 낮은 형사책임이 부과된다. See Ibid, p. 257.

⁴³⁾ Supra Note 25, para. 462.

⁴⁴⁾ Supra Note 18, pp. 237-238.

⁴⁵⁾ 박미경, Supra Note 21, pp. 161-165.

⁴⁶⁾ 박경규, Supra Note 3, pp. 298-301.

⁴⁷⁾ 각 국의 형법은 ①정범과 공범을 구분하는 공범체계, ②정범과 공범을 구분하지 않고 정범만을 상정하는 통일정범자 체계로 대별할 수 있다. 세부적인 사항은 박미경, Supra Note 21, pp. 161-165. 참조.; 독일법계 국가는 공범과 비교할 때 정범에 더 무거운 형사책임을 부과한다. 세부적인 사항은 박경규, Supra Note 3, pp. 302-308. 참조.

⁴⁸⁾ 만약, 2개 이상의 형사책임 유형에 대해 유죄판결을 받은 경우 각각의 형사책임 유형 통계에 모두 산입되었다. See Supra Note 4, pp. 429-430.

⁴⁹⁾ 임시 국제형사재판소 형량선고의 일반원칙은 ①범죄의 중대성·총체성 원칙(Principle of Primacy of Gravity and Principle of Totality), ②비례성 원칙(Principle of Proportionality), ③차등 원칙(Principle of Gradation), ④개별화 원칙(Principle of Individualisation)으로 대별할 수 있다. See Barbora Holá, “Sentencing of International Crimes at the ICTY and ICTR”, Amsterdam Law Forum, Fall Issue, 2012, pp. 8-11.

⁵⁰⁾ 2010년 6월까지 이루어진 ICTY와 ICTR의 판결 111건(ICTY: 71건, ICTR: 40건)을 중심으로 형량 분석이 이루어졌으며, 종신형(life imprisonment)은 55년형으로 환원하여 통계분석을 수행하였다. See Supra Note 4, pp. 413-414.

⁵¹⁾ See Ibid., pp. 429-430.

⁵²⁾ ICTR의 경우 대부분의 사건에서 동일한 자가 여러 형사책임 유형에 대해 유죄판결을 받았으며, 주로 살인과 폭력 혐의로 기소되어 형사책임 유형의 중위값간 편차가 크지 않다. See Ibid., pp. 429-430.

⁵³⁾ See Ibid., pp. 429-430.

⁵⁴⁾ Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgement and Sentence of 27 September 2016, para. 57.

⁵⁵⁾ Ibid., para. 58.

⁵⁵⁾ “58. The Appeals Chamber has noted that the Statute differentiates between principal (Article 25(3)(a)) and accessorial (Article 25(3)(b) to (d)) liability, with principals bearing more blameworthiness ‘generally speaking and all other things being equal’. In accordance with this general rule, given that the Chamber has decided that all the elements of co-perpetration are met, there is no need to make any further findings on the accessorial liability alternatives.“ (emphasis added, footnote omitted)

⁵⁶⁾ Prosecutor v. Bemba et al., ICC-01/05-01/13, Decision Re-sentencing Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Mr Aimé Kilolo Musamba and Mr Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo of 17 September 2018, para. 89; Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute of 23 May 2014, para. 147.

⁵⁷⁾ Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dylio, Supra Note 10, paras. 336-337.

⁵⁷⁾ “336. Moreover, the Chamber observes that the wording of article 25(3)(d) of the Statute begins with the words “[i]n any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime.“

⁵⁷⁾ 337. Hence, in the view of the Chamber, article 25(3)(d) of the Statute provides for a residual form of accessory liability which makes it possible to criminalise those contributions to a crime which cannot be characterised as ordering, soliciting, inducing, aiding, abetting or assisting within the meaning of article 25(3)(b) or article 25(3)(c) of the Statute, by reason of the state of mind in which the contributions were made.“ (emphasis added)

⁵⁸⁾ Gerhard Werle, SupraNote 21, pp. 956-957.

⁵⁹⁾ Supra Note 54, para. 60.

⁵⁹⁾ “60. There is no indication in either the Statute or Appeals Chamber jurisprudence of any hierarchy within the variations set out under Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute, nor does the Chamber believe that establishing one is necessary or appropriate. The Chamber considers that, when all the elements of different variations under Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute are proven, the Chamber must elect which mode of responsibility best reflects the full scope of the Accused’s individual criminal responsibility. The Accused can be convicted of only one form of Article 25(3)(a) commission for each incident or discrete type of criminal conduct, as to conclude otherwise not only contributes little to the fair labelling of the responsibility of the accused but it also punishes them twice for the commission of the same crime.“ (emphasis added)

⁶⁰⁾ Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Sentencing judgment of 7 November 2019, para. 15.

⁶⁰⁾ “15. The Statute does not pre-establish any in abstracto hierarchy among individual modes of liability for the purposes of sentencing. The ultimate assessment of the level of culpability of the convicted person and its impact on the sentence always depends on an in concreto assessment of the degree of participation and the degree of intent in the particular circumstances of the case. The Chamber considers that the commission of a crime through any of the modes of liability set out in Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute amounts to principal perpetration, and that direct perpetration is therefore not inherently more grave than co-perpetration or indirect co-perpetration for the purposes of sentencing.“ (emphasis added, footnote omitted)

⁶¹⁾ 이준구, ｢미시경제학｣(법문사, 2002), pp. 630-631.

⁶²⁾ 국제형사법상 정범 외연에 대한 분석모형 수립을 위해 범죄-형벌 경제이론(Economic Theory of Crime and Punishment)을 참조하였다. See Robert Cooter·Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics, Fifth Edition, (Pearson, 2008), pp. 491-517.

⁶³⁾ Ibid., pp. 494-498.

⁶⁴⁾ Ibid.,pp. 498-499.

⁶⁵⁾ Ibid., pp. 494-498.

⁶⁶⁾ Ibid., pp. 494-498.

⁶⁷⁾ Supra Note 54, para. 57.

⁶⁷⁾ “58. The Appeals Chamber has noted that the Statute differentiates between principal (Article 25(3)(a)) and accessorial (Article 25(3)(b) to (d)) liability, with principals bearing more blameworthiness ‘generally speaking and all other things being equal’. In accordance with this general rule, given that the Chamber has decided that all the elements of co-perpetration are met, there is no need to make any further findings on the accessorial liability alternatives.“ (emphasis added, footnote omitted)

⁶⁸⁾ Supra Note 25, para. 462.

⁶⁹⁾ Supra Note 62, pp. 494-498.

⁷⁰⁾ Ibid., pp. 494-498.

⁷¹⁾ 국제형사재판소 규정 제25조제3항 (a)호에 규정된 간접범죄실행과 (b)호에 규정된 명령, 교사를 비교할 때, 후자에 비해 전자가 반드시 비난가능성이 더 크다고 보기 어려운 측면이 존재한다. 세부적인 사항은 Supra Note 1, pp 94-96. 참조.

⁷²⁾ Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Supra Note 20, para. 8.

⁷²⁾ “8. Some have suggested that Article 25(3) establishes a hierarchy of seriousness as regards the various forms of participation in a crime, with Article 25(3)(a) constituting the gravest example and Article 25(3)(d) the least serious. I am unable to adopt this approach. In my judgment, there is no proper basis for concluding that ordering, soliciting or inducing a crime (Article 25(3)(b)) is a less serious form of commission than committing it “through another person” (Article 25(3)(a)), and these two concepts self-evidently overlap. Similarly, I am unable to accept that the criminality of accessories (Article 25(3)(c)) is greater than those who participate within a group (Article 25(3)(d)), particularly since many of history’s most serious crimes occurred as the result of the coordinated action of groups of individuals, who jointly pursued a common goal.“ (footnote omitted, emphasis addaed)

⁷³⁾ Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo, Supra Note 20, para. 22.

⁷³⁾ “The control of the crime theory has been introduced ostensibly to provide a criterion to make a normative distinction between principals under Article 25(3)(a) and accessories under Articles 25(3)(b)-(d) of the Statute. The perceived need for making such a distinction is premised on the assumption that there exists a hierarchy in Article 25(3) according to which principals are considered to be more blameworthy than accessories. Although I can see that there is a conceptual difference between principal and accessorial criminal responsibility (one is direct and the other derivative), I do not believe that this necessarily translates to a different legal treatment of those who are found guilty under one or the other form. Indeed, the fact that principals are connected more directly to the bringing about of the material elements of the crime than accessories does not imply that the role of the former should be regarded as inherently more blameworthy.“ (footnote omitted, emphasis added)

⁷⁴⁾ Jens David Ohlin·Elies Van Siledregt·Thomas Weigend, Supra Note 27, pp. 740-743.

⁷⁵⁾ Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Supra Note 20, para. 9.

⁷⁵⁾ “9. I am also unpersuaded that it will assist the work of the Court to establish a hierarchy of seriousness that is dependent on creating rigorous distinctions between the modes of liability within Article 25(3) of the Statute. Whilst it might have been of assistance to “rank” the various modes of liability if, for instance, sentencing was strictly determined by the specific provision on which an individual’s conviction is based, considerations of this kind do not apply at the ICC. Article 78 of the Statute and Rule 145 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which govern the sentences that are to be imposed, provide that an individual’s sentence is to be decided on the basis of “all the relevant factors”, “including the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person”. Although the “degree of participation” is one of the factors listed in Rule 145(1)(c) of the Rules, these provisions overall do not narrowly determine the sentencing range by reference to the mode of liability under which the accused is convicted, and instead this is simply one of a number of relevant factors.“ (emphasis addaed)